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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

Evidence-Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-Waiver and Its
Effect Upon Subsequent Proceedings
Witness testified before a federal grand jury regarding his participation in acts regarded by the grand jury as constituting a conspirarcy
to committ an offense against or to defraud the United States.' The
grand jury returned an indictment naming the witness as a co-conspirator. At the trial of the other co-conspirators the government called the witness and asked him a series of questions similar to those
answered by him at the grand jury investigation. He refused to answer
these questions on the ground that his answers would tend to incriminate him. Held: the witness was privileged to refuse to answer
these questions. His voluntary testimony at the grand jury investigation did not constitute a waiver of his privilege 2 against self incrimination. 3
This seems to be a case of first impression in the federal courts.
Earlier, federal cases have held, on the theory of waiver, that a witness
who has already incriminated himself by his testimony before a grand
jury cannot stop short of full disclosure to the grand jury of all the
facts surrounding his crime, unless these facts tend to further incriminate him concerning other crimes. 4 The record of this testimony
has been used as evidence in a later criminal prosecution. 5 However,
in the instant case, the government, on the theory of waiver, sought
to force the witness, himself, to divulge the evidence at the subsequent
criminal prosecution.
Although it is settled that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is not applicable to state courts, 6 interpretations by
state courts of similarly worded state constitutions may aid in analyzing the instant decision. These courts have held that the voluntary
testimony of a witness before a grand jury7 or other preliminary and
separate proceeding s is not a waiver for the later trial, nor is testimony
62 Stat. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1950).

-U.S. Const. Amend. V.: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself...." For a history of the development
of the privilege against self-incrimination see 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2250
(3d ed. 1940); Note, 30 Neb. L. Rev. 643 (1951); Note, 18 Brooklyn L. Rev. 287
(1951); Imlay, The Paradoxical Self-Incrimination Rule, 6 Miami L. Q. 147

(1951).
'United States v. Malone, 111 F. Sup. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1953).

'Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (Witness testified she was
a Communist but refused to testify further; held, she must also name the
person to whom she gave confidential records.); United States v. St. Pierre,
132 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1942).
1United Sates v. Thomas, 49 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Ky. 1943).
'Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937).
"Apodaca v. Viramontes, 53 N.M. 514, 212 P.2d 425 (1949); Duckworth v.

Dist. Ct., 220 Iowa 1350, 264 N.W. 715 (1936).
B Ex parte Sales, 134 Cal. App. 54, 24 P.2d 916 (1933); Ex parte Berman,
105 Cal. App. 37, 287 Pac. 125 (1930); People v. Cassidy, 213 N.Y. 388, 107 N.E.
713 (1915); In re Mark, 146 Mich. 714, 110 N.W. 61 (1906).

RECENT CASES

in one criminal trial a waiver for a subsequent prosecution.9 The cases
reason that unless this view is adopted a witness in the second trial
might be subjected to a more searching cross-examination and thus be
required to give testimony that he did not anticipate when testfying
at the previous investigation. This is especially true where the first
proceeding is non-adversary, e.g., a grand jury investigation where the
witness' counsel is normally not present.
In United States t. Steffen, 10 a recent federal case, it was held that
voluntary testimony during one criminal trial does not constitute a
waiver of the privilege by the witness in a later trial involving a
different offense.'" The court applied the reasoning above and, in addition, stated that the second admission would add to the weight of the
evidence which the government might present at the criminal prosecution.
The court in the instant case recognized these arguments and
pointed out that the reasoning is even more compelling where the witness first testifies at a private hearing, and is later called upon to state
the same evidence at a public criminal prosecution. Public opinion
resulting from the notoriety accompanying the criminal trial might
force subsequent prosecution of the witness, where such would not
be the case is his testimony were not publicized. Evidence discovered
following the grand jury investigation, coupled with the testimony the
witness is now asked to give, may make his testimony incriminating
whereas it was harmless at the time of the earlier proceeding.
It is submitted that the instant case is a logical extension of the law
set out by previous authorities, and together with the Steffen case
3
should serve as a guide 2 in later litigation in this field.'
ALFRED W. BLESSING, '55
'The rule applies in a retrial of the same case, Emery v. State, 101 Wis.
627, 78 N.W. 145 (1899), or an entirely new criminal action, Burdy v. Conroy,
182 Misc. 476, 48 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1944); State v. Sentner, 230 Iowa 590,
298 N.W. 813 (1941).
10103 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
"Another federal case which sems to support, in spirit at least, the view
adopted in the instant case is McCarthy v. Arndstein, 254 U.S. 71 (1920), reaff'd,
266 U.S. 34 (1924). Defendant was adjudged an involuntary bankrupt after he
filed schedules of assets and liabilities under direction of bankruptcy court.
Pursuant to a subpoena he then appeared before a special commissioner and
during examination invoked his privilege with regard to cektain of the'commissioner's questions. Held: witness's previous testimony, i.e., filing of schedules of assets and liabilities, did not constitute a waiver since there had'been
no revelation of incriminating facts. The witness could still stop short whenever

he could fairly claim that to answer would tend to incriminate him.
A recent case in the Third Circuit, also concerning wiiver of privilege
by testifying at a grand jury investigation, has applied the reasonihg- of *the
instant case and reached the same decision. In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.
1953).
"The possibility of a case in the near future involving the effect of gibing
testimony at a legislative committee investigation upon an attempt in a sub-

